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HUDGENS' PLEADINGS SATISFY THE INTENT TO INJURE STANDARD 
SET FORTH IN HELF. 
Although it acknowledges that Helf v. Chevron USA. Inc.. 203 P.3d 962 (I Jtah 2009) 
Amended Complaint Hudgens filed satisfy the criteria this • t articulated in that cast" for 
alleging the exception to the exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
r T c A § 34-2" 1 °* T-"*cad, Prosper misstates or mhcharacterizes several elements of the 
p e rh apS Prosper's most important contrivance is when it argi les that this Coi n it" s 
discussion of intent and motivation in Helf, 203 P.3d at 972, is dicta. See Prosper Brief at 
p 14 In making this extraordinary assertion, Prosper ignores the clear and unequivocal 
oiiuiiiieenictits oil 11 it I ninl iiii illllul t d .r I n example, Ilk I omul ilitlal 
[T]he legal definition of intent encompasses more than 
simply motive . . . . The distinction between intent and 
motive is particularly important in applying the intent to 
injure' standard because an intentional injury may arise in 
instances where the employer intentionally placed an 
employee in harm's way, but the employer's motive was to 
increase profits - not to inflict injury. 
Helf, 203 P.3d at 972 (emphasis added). 
Of course this is not dicta. It is a central element of the Court's analysis and 
discussion of the very law at issue in this case. Accoiviiu^i.v. rro^pu s efforts to argue that 
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Hudgens has failed to adequately plead intent to injure, since he alleged that the purpose of 
the waterboarding exercise was to motivate,1 must fail. The legal intent to injure as 
articulated by the Court in Helf does not turn on the allegations of motivation but rather on 
the allegation that Prosper knew or expected that injury would come from the waterboarding 
exercise. Helf, 203 P.3d at 972. Hudgens made these very allegations in paragraphs 13 
through 17 of his original Complaint and his Amended Complaint. See Verified Complaint, 
Addendum, Ex. A, R 8 -11 , Proposed Amended Complaint, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 99 -100. 
Moreover, the distinction between legal intent and motive was resolved by 
paragraph 17 of Hudgens' proposed Amended Complaint which reads as follows: 
Christopherson had a conscious and deliberate intent to 
injure Hudgens by use of waterboarding. This is so because 
Christopherson believed that the only way in which the 
motivational exercise could succeed was to cause Hudgens to 
experience the panic and suffocation integral to the purpose 
and functioning of waterboarding. This is why 
Christopherson directed a team member to hold Hudgens' 
head in place so that it would not move as he poured water 
in Hudgens' nose and mouth. This is why Christopherson 
did not stop pouring water into Hudgens' nose and mouth 
until the jug was empty even though he saw Hudgens 
struggling to breathe. In other words, by consciously and 
deliberately waterboarding Hudgens, Christopherson 
exhibited a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an 
injury to Hudgens. 
1
 See Prosper Brief at p. 14. 
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1 ludgens' proposed Amended Complaint at^ f 17 (emphasis added), Addendum, Ex. C, R. 99. 
This pleading clearly satisfies the Helf criteria because it sets forth facts demonstrating 
Prosper' s knowledge and expectation ol nijiiiy from the wate* nig ^xoiuse. 
"\ s inmd nnlm jiiicc n , 1'iospn ' i suggestion lliiil iiiii nli i In JlLiik: ii n Linn iiiiiiilti 11 ilh III, 
Iludgens must demonstrate that Prosper knew specifically vvliat^um I li^^ens would suffer 
from flu? waterboarding Tim- Pumper argues, since Hudgens alleged ait injury in his 
pleauings mat \\a^ > uiiiereni lion* ..le "transit") di^ oniM-M m. ^xpenen^cu as a result of 
beings aterboa* * • • * He* 1 !- .'i 
have an "actual knowledge of the dangerous condition,'"" S ee Prosper Brief at pp. u - i t . 
This assertion misstates Helf. 
Nothing in iicii requires 1 ludgens to allege that Pio.^ pci knew that a certain kind of 
• It .. i ' : *- H I l i i i \\ 01 i 'VpQ ItlJ! 
injur} would be the consequence ol' l i u ! actions." I^cJL 203 P.3d at 974. Moreover, 
I ludgens alleged in his Verified Coinplaim and proposed ' mended Complaint that 
w aterboarding "is designed to, among other things, create panic and t* >nl a^ion ui u -K MI 
Iby rrr i i lmj ' (he i n m n ^ m n m IIK suhjn/l lliimil he r ho MIIII<> "n V r r i l i a i < 'omplainl .il H II ' \ 
Addendum, Ex. A, K. ':. Additionally, Christopherson stated at the conclusion of the 
watcrboarding exercise that he wanted the sales team to work as hard at making sales as 
I ludgens had worked to breathe while he VUL\ being wuicrU/di omplaint at 
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Tf 17, Addendum, Ex. A. R. 8. Thus, Christopherson was aware that the waterboarding had 
produced the expected result - feelings of panic and suffocation in Hudgens. Accordingly, 
Hudgens has adequately identified the known or expected consequences of Prosper's conduct 
as Helf requires. 
A third contrivance Prosper offers is that because Hudgens "volunteered" for the 
exercise, there can be no finding of intent to injure. See Prosper Brief at p. 15. This 
argument completely ignores the express language of both the Verified Complaint and 
proposed Amended Complaint. In both, Hudgens alleged he volunteered for the exercise 
before being told what it was and then, more importantly, was forcibly restrained by his co-
workers, at Christopherson's direction, while Christopherson emptied a gallon jug of water 
into Hudgens' nose and mouth. Verified Complaint at ^ 13 - 16, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9, 
proposed Amended Complaint at ^ 13 - 16, R. 99 - 100. Prosper's argument is therefore 
flatly wrong and should be rejected.2 
Clearly, then, Prosper has failed to properly analyze the applicability of the Helf 
decision to this case. As a result, it fails to adequately support its claims that Hudgens has 
failed to satisfy the intent to injure requirement. To the contrary, it is obvious that he has. 
2
 And, of course, it seeks yet again to deprive Hudgens of the inferences to which he is entitled 
as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss, Helf, 203 P.3d at 965, by making a factual conclusion that is 
inconsistent with other assertions Hudgens made in his pleadings. 
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II. HUDGENS HAS ADEQUATELY STATED A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION. 
In arguing that the Trial Court was correct in dismissing Hudgens' claim for wrongful 
termination, Prosper again misapplies the applicable law regarding the public policy 
exception to the employment at-will doctrine and ignores several critical points that 
undermine its arguments generally. 
First, Prosper dismisses as "gossamer" the numerous manifestations of Utah public 
policy on the physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the work place. 
See Hudgens' Opening Memorandum at pp. 18 -19. Instead, it seems to argue that the only 
public policies that are acceptable are the ones that already exist. However, this case presents 
an entirely new set of facts that do not fit neatly into previously articulated categories. 
Obviously, of course, it never seemed necessary before now to have an explicit policy 
preventing employers from waterboarding their employees. Yet, that is the situation 
presented to the Court here. In this regard, then, it is significant to recall this Court's analysis 
of public policy in Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004) which 
Prosper again ignores: 
The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies 
to a particular legal right or privilege will frequently require 
a balancing of competing legitimate interests: The interests 
of the employer to regulate the workplace environment to 
promote productivity, security and similar lawful objectives 
and the interests of the employees to maximize access to 
their statutory and constitutional rights within the 
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workplace 'Public policy' is a label we attach to those 
shared expectations and standards of conduct which have 
acquired both widespread and deeply held allegiance among 
the citizens generally, 
(emphasis added). This is the touchstone for determining whether Hudgens has adequately 
identified a public policy. It is not whether the public policy already exists, as Prosper seems 
to contend. 
Second, Prosper misreads the pleading requirements to make a claim for a public 
policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Prosper criticizes Hudgens for failing to allege how 
his conduct brought the public policy he articulates into play as required by Ryan v. Dan's 
Food Stores. 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). See Prosper Brief at p. 20. However, this 
Court in Ryan stated that another way to satisfy this requirement "is to determine whether 
dismissing employees under circumstances involved in plaintiff s dismissal would jeopardize 
the public policy." Ryan, 972 P.2d at n. 4. Hudgens has satisfied this criteria. 
Clearly, for Hudgens to be constructively terminated following an assault on him by 
his employer jeopardizes the very foundation of the public policy he asserts: Protecting the 
physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the workplace. This was 
alleged in paragraphs 30-32 of the proposed Amended Complaint, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 86 
- 87. Accordingly, Hudgens has in fact satisfied that element of the pleading criteria under 
Ryan. 
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Prosper also argues that Hudgens has failed to properly plead the causal connection 
between the policy he asserts and his termination. In making this argument, Prosper again 
ignores this Court's analysis in the Ryan case. There, the Court said "the employee initially 
need only show that the conduct bringing the policy into place 'was a cause of the firing.'" 
Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404 (emphasis added). The conduct bringing the policy into play in this 
case, of course, is the waterboarding of Chad Hudgens - the cause of Hudgens' constructive 
termination. Hudgens has satisfied the pleading requirements for an exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine. His wrongful termination claim should be allowed to proceed. 
Finally, Prosper mischaracterizes Hudgens' argument by claiming that he alleges "he 
was terminated for refusing to commit an unlawful act." Prosper Brief at p. 21. Of course, 
Hudgens made no such allegation. What Hudgens argued was that "the unique facts of this 
case are very much akin to a specific category identified by the Court that involves a 
'clear and substantial public policy,' to wit, discharging an employee for refusing to 
commit an unlawful act See Touchard v. La-Z-Bov. Inc.. 148 P.3d 945,948 (Utah 2006)." 
Opening Memorandum at p. 21 (emphasis added). Hudgens argued that he was 
constructively discharged for refusing to work in an environment in which his employer 
behaved in an unlawful manner towards him. Consistent with its practice of avoiding all 
references to what actually transpired in this case, Prosper ignores this argument. Yet, it 
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remains a compelling justification for reversing the Trial Court's dismissal of Hudgens' 
claim for wrongful termination. 
III. HUDGENS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO 
FULLY DEVELOP HIS CLAIMS. 
A. Prosper Again Ignores The Helf Decision. 
Prosper argues that Hudgens should not be allowed to amend his Complaint because 
the allegations of the Amended Complaint contradict the allegations of his original 
Complaint Prosper Brief at pp. 25 -26. It relies upon Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170.1172-
73 (Utah 1983), a case in which the Utah Supreme Court held that an affidavit from a party 
that contradicted that party's prior sworn testimony could not create a genuine issue of 
material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. This is not analogous to the 
situation presented here. 
Prosper further argues that Hudgens' original allegations, which it claims are binding 
on him, fail to overcome the exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105. These arguments fail for several reasons. First, the allegations in 
Hudgens' proposed Amended Complaint do not "contradict" the allegations in his original 
Complaint. Prosper's argument is predicated upon an analysis of the requirement regarding 
pleading intent to injure that completely ignores this Court's Helf decision. In other words, 
because Hudgens satisfied the pleading requirements under Helf in both his original Verified 
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Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint, Prosper's arguments against allowing 
amendment on the grounds of "contradicting" Hudgens' original allegations fall flat. 
Prosper's focus on purported contradictions also enmeshes this Court in making 
factual determinations about whether allegations in the proposed Amended Complaint really 
do contradict the allegations in the original Complaint. This is so because the Trial Court did 
not make any findings supporting its decision to deny Hudgens' motion.3 It is not appropriate 
to ask the Court to conduct a factual inquiry on matters that were not decided below. See, 
e.g.. Willey v. Willev. 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) ("It is inappropriate in most 
instances for an appellate court... to assume the task of weighing evidence and making 
its own findings of fact. The appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy 
and uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters") (emphasis 
added). 
B. Prosper Completely Ignores New Allegations Supporting a Wrongful 
Termination Claim. 
The Trial Court ruled that Hudgens had not adequately pled an exception to the at-will 
doctrine. See Ruling at pp. 5 - 6 , Addendum, Ex. B, R. 87 - 88. Hudgens' proposed 
Amended Complaint directly addressed this deficiency by alleging that he was constructively 
3
 Of course, this in itself constitutes an abuse of discretion. Kelleyv. Hard Money Funding, Inc.. 
87 P.3d 734, 746 (Utah App. 2004). 
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terminated, that a substantial public policy interest in maintaining his physical and emotional 
integrity at work was violated, that Hudgens' termination jeopardized that policy and that is 
a causal connection between the policy and Hudgens' termination. See proposed Amended 
Complaint at fflf 30 - 33, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 96 - 97; Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404. 
As discussed above, see pp. 4 -7 , Prosper ignores these allegations choosing instead 
to focus upon a highly constricted view of the law. In choosing this path, Prosper fails to 
address one of the central purposes of U. R. Civ. P. 15 for freely allowing amendment of 
claims: "The Court's ultimate goal is to have the 'real controversy between the parties 
presented, the rights determined and the case decided.'" Savage v. Utah Youth Village. 
104 P.3d 1242, 1245 (Utah 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Nor does Prosper address the fact that nearly every case it relies on to defeat Hudgens' 
claims was decided on a full factual record. This point is significant because it indicates a 
reluctance on the Court's part to simply decide cases involving these employment related 
issues without the benefit of a factual record. Indeed, in this regard, this Court has held: 
When a motion to dismiss is made, the trial court should 
adhere to a policy of being reluctant to turn a party out of 
court without a trial. A dismissal which does so is a severe 
measure and such a motion should be granted only when it 
clearly appears that the party would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of facts provable in support of its claim. In 
ruling on such a motion the court should accept as true all 
material allegations and such reasonable inferences as to 
proof that properly could be addressed thereunder. 
Moreover, consistent with the policy of allowing parties 
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access to the courts to settle controversies, where there is 
doubt about the foregoing it should be resolved in favor of 
allowing the party the opportunity of presenting its proof. 
Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Company. Inc., 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). 
Hudgens deserves an opportunity to make his case. This Court should reverse the 
Trial Court's denial of Hudgens' Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint and should 
allow Hudgens to file and serve that Amended Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S day of February, 2010. 
By £L 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
Reply Brief.wpd 
-11-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f*tt 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the S day of February, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM (along with a searchable 
CD), was served upon the persons named below, at the address set out below their name, 
either by mailing postage prepaid, hand-delivery, Federal Express, or by telecopying to them, 
a true and correct copy of said document. 
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq. 
Andrew V. Wright, Esq. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Attorney for Appellee/Defendants 
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4844 North 300 West 
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i-[OLS. Mail 
] Federal Express 
] Hand-Delivery 
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] Other: 
By lif. 
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